



Advisory Committee
on Social Witness Policy



GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

by Ruy O. Costa



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Ruy O. Costa, Ph.D

**A study paper prepared at the request of the
Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy (ACSWP)
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)**



Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy

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An Invitation to Study . . .

The last few years have seen a rapid change in the way we understand and live in our world. The process of "globalization" puts a label on that new way of understanding our life and our planet. Yet just what "globalization" is and means—whether it is full of opportunity or peril—remains to be discerned in both the short and long term. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) acknowledges it has a responsibility to be part of that discernment process.

With the adoption in 1996 of *Hope for a Global Future: Toward Just and Sustainable Human Development* by the 208th General Assembly, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)'s Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy (ACSWP) was directed

to monitor the implementation and consequences of the recent international agreements and mechanisms for expanding world trade—such as NAFTA, GATT, WTO with special concern for the effects of trade on the poor, the natural environment, local communities, and the distribution of power among the actors in economic development. The ACSWP shall report periodically to the General Assembly and its relevant agencies on its findings and their implications for the further development of policy on international trade and the church's advocacy on trade issues in the public arena. (Minutes, 208th General Assembly (1996), pp. 114, 542)

The ACSWP, aware of the rapidly changing dynamics involved in world trade issues, discussed how to analyze critically the interrelating and interconnecting concerns of world trade issues and how to produce something helpful that would engage the church. It asked: how do complex and challenging global issues, such as world trade and economic globalization, enter the life of the congregation?

As a response to the General Assembly action, the committee set in motion a process whereby four timely papers would be developed approaching world trade issues in their current context of rapid globalization. The goal would be to engage the church in dialogue without a loss of core Christian values. The challenge would be to connect what is happening in the global economy to how it impacts the local economy and its lifestyle. These four papers—all affirming that economics is a matter of faith—would be made available to the church for study, reflection, and feedback to the ACSWP. The committee would then pull together its learning into a resolution for possible submission to a future General Assembly.

Gordon Douglass, former chair of the ACSWP, who had served on the task force that produced *Hope for a Global Future*, and a consulting economist and former vice-president for academic affairs and dean of Franklin and Marshall College, was invited to draft the first paper: *The Globalization of Economic Life: Challenge to the Church*. He did so in December of 1997 and it has served as a foundational document for the committee's extended reflection. He kindly updated it in November 1999 for this publication. Both versions have had broad distribution and have sparked engaging discussions. The paper serves to define economic globalization and to introduce the theological and ethical considerations for the three papers that would follow and, thus, is a key document to be read prior to the other papers. It examines the impact of economic growth and the challenges brought by the new political dynamic experienced in globalization.

The committee invited the International Labor Rights Fund to prepare the second paper: *The Employment Effects of Free Trade and Globalization*. Pharis Harvey, a United Methodist minister and, at the time, the executive director of the International Labor Rights Fund, oversaw the development of this paper in conjunction with a work team of the ACSWP. This paper looks at the connection between resources and labor and the need for the church to address the intentional exploitation of people for profit. Thus, it has a focus on the all-important impact of the international trade agreements on the people involved in producing the goods. It offers for consideration several challenging policy options.

Globalization and the Environment is the topic of the third paper by Robert L. Stivers, Professor of Religion at Pacific Lutheran University with a specialty in Christian environmental ethics. He is author or co-author of four and editor of three books, the latest with James Martin-Schramm: *Christian Environmental Ethics: A Case Method Approach* (Orbis Books, 2003). Over the years, Stivers has been a frequent contributor to Presbyterian statements on the environment. The focus of this paper is environmental degradation and a

very careful analysis of the attitudes toward nature---now in conflict with newly emerging attitudes more conducive to environmental integrity---assumed in economic and political decisions. Complementing and following Stivers' essay is the helpful Appendix on "Trade Aspects of Globalization and the Environment," developed by Jaydee Hanson, a consultant on public policy issues including trade, environment and biotechnology issues and a member of the National Council of Churches' Eco-Justice Working group. He has served in various positions for the United Methodist Church, including being their public policy director and their Environmental Justice Program Director. Prior to working for the United Methodist Church, he worked for the U.S. Commerce Department on trade and fisheries policy. The useful Appendix points to a number of Internet sites related to trade and environment that monitor the environmental impact of world trade and economic globalization.

The final of the four papers, *Globalization and Culture*, is by the recent chair of the Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy: Ruy O. Costa. Costa is an immigrant from Brazil, and an elder in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). He holds a Ph.D. in religious studies from Boston University and is the Executive Director of the Episcopal City Mission in Boston, Massachusetts, and he and his family attend the Eliot Church in Lowell, MA. His paper examines the impact of world trade and globalization on culture. He addresses the cultural exchanges that accompany the globalization of markets, communication, media, migration of peoples and the rapid changes in global geo-politics. Costa questions whether the cultural exchanges are occasions for the celebration of progress or a time for concern over exported values always keeping his focus on the role the church can and does play in the world.

The ACSWP invites sessions and other groups within congregations, as well as presbytery and synod committees or groups, to explore the issues contained in this study document (and in the whole series) and to respond with any and all discernment of the Spirit so that the work group and committee will be informed as they prepare and propose a resolution on trade to the 217th General Assembly (2006).

A study document of the General Assembly seeks to stimulate study and discussion within the church on particular social issues. It is not to be construed as a social witness policy of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). Therefore, nothing in this document can be used to direct the mission program of the church. This study document is distributed to inform and help prepare a resolution.

Reflections and feedback from the study of this document should be sent to the offices of the Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy. We encourage prayerful study and reflection to continue to occur in congregations and presbytery groups. Feedback will be accepted through December 31, 2005, for use by the Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy in its response to the Assembly.

Send your comments and reflections to:

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Peter A. Sulyok, Coordinator
Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy

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by

Ruy O. Costa, Ph.D

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GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

Précis

The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) affirms cultural diversity as a matter of conviction and modesty. As a partner in mission with churches around the globe, the PC(USA) is an agent of global cultural exchange. In the Reformed tradition, the proclamation of the gospel is accompanied by the creation of institutions (such as schools and hospitals) that have impact on cultures. As an investor in the global economy, the church is also aware of its impact on the lives of people near and far. So, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) wants to be a responsible partner in this process and, through this paper, seeks to contribute to the discussion.

Globalization and Culture addresses the cultural exchanges that accompany the globalization of markets with the expansion of financial systems, means of communication, movements of people and radical changes in global geo-politics. Working assumptions about culture are teased out by introductory remarks on language, values and philosophy. Then, concepts emerging in the studies and debates over the impact of globalization on culture(s) are organized around the notion that the economic exchanges promoted by the globalization of the economy are accompanied by a cultural exchange in which the developed nations import greater cultural diversity from around the globe while exporting to the developing nations the cultural habits of production and consumption of the developed world. Some celebrate this exchange as progress; yet, others raise concern about certain values that are exported by the developed nations. One example is the globalization of time pressures that characterize the industrial and postindustrial organization of work and renders traditional practices like a common day of rest and worship unpractical for too many people.

The paper ends with a reaffirmation of the Presbyterian Church's role in serious cross-cultural dialogue and a list of questions for further reflection, such as: What are the values that we want to encourage PC(USA) agents to export?

What are the values that we do not want to export? Since money can cross national borders on a click of a keyboard, should people,

investors and workers alike, be allowed to cross borders too? What are our hopes and fears for the future of the human race? If present trends do not change, how do we think things will be in a hundred years? In five hundred years?

Introduction

Mrs. Chang is a fifty-eight-year-old retired high school teacher. She and her husband, also a teacher, own a modest three-bedroom apartment. When Mr. Chang's father died, his mother moved from the countryside to reside with him, her eldest son. Mr. and Mrs. Chang rented the apartment across the hall from their own to accommodate her, so that they could maintain the ideal of three-generation cohabitation without sacrificing their own and their two adult daughters' privacy. Two years ago, Mrs. Chang convinced her husband to hire a Filipina worker to take care of his increasingly frail mother, who now needed daily assistance and personal care. Mrs. Chang then transferred most of her previous duties, including preparing meals, bathing, and changing diapers, to the Filipina worker. More than once during our interview, Mrs. Chang felt compelled to legitimize her decision to hire someone to take care of her mother-in-law:

I may sound like I have no sense of filial piety to you, but I have been serving her for twenty years! If you want to be a good daughter-in-law, you can no longer be yourself. Fortunately, it doesn't cost that much to hire a Filipina maid these days. . . .¹

At the same time, Filipina maids leave their children behind to be raised by their extended families, as told by Rosemarie Samaniego:

When the girl that I take care of calls her mother "Mama," my heart jumps all the time because my children also call me "Mama." I feel the gap caused by our physical separation especially in the morning, when I pack [her] lunch, because that's what I used to do for my children. . . . I used to do that very same thing for them. I begin thinking of all this hour I should be taking care of my very own children and not someone else's, someone who is not related to me in any way, shape, or form. . . . The work that I do here is done for my family, but the problem is they are not close to me but are far away in the Philippines. Sometimes, you feel the separation and you start to cry.²

Authors Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild document and interpret the phenomenon of growing female migration from the developing world to the developed world to replace domestic labor and love as nannies, maids and sex workers as the latest unfolding of a global exploitation of women and the transfer of resources from the third to the first world. The fact that first world women are pressed by the economy to invest their productive time in marketable activity creates a market demand for workers in the areas that Ehrenreich and Hochschild researched. At the same time Latina, Filipina and other Asian woman bring a culture of tenderness and affection to the lives of time-pressed first world families. So, the economic pressures on third world economies and the market demands in the first world conspire together to foster this global exploitation of women and commodification of third world culture in the first world.

The concrete economic exchanges fostered by the globalization of the economy conceal another equally important exchange taking place among nations, an exchange of cultures: the first world imports cultural diversity and cultural goods at the same time that the first world exports its industrial and post industrial habits of work and consumption to developing nations. How do we interpret and evaluate this global exchange?

Theological Framework

Churches in the Reformed tradition bring a complex theological equation to their reflection on culture and globalization. On the one hand churches have been agents of globalization for two thousand years. The spreading of the Christian faith and the building of institutions that came with it precede by millennia the current globalization of the economy and have set some of the conditions that foster further cultural exchanges among peoples. On the other hand the history of the church has its dark side as well and the expansion of Christendom did not always bring justice, peace and reconciliation to new lands. We should not forget the crusades.

Reformed Christians believe in a cultural mandate in the broad sense that Genesis describes the human race created in the image and likeness of a creative Creator who also instructs us to "name nature" and to cultivate the Garden of Eden. To cultivate is to create culture;

yet, at the same time, history from a Reformed perspective warns against confusing "Gospel" with culture. From the very beginning of the Reformation, churches in the Reformed tradition have understood that at the heart of the mission of the church is a social witness, which often confronts the larger culture. Misogyny, xenophobia, homophobia, consumerism, and racism, for example, are cultural traits that Reformed churches have debated. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) has both rejected and denounced them.

On the other hand, we must acknowledge that in their missionary drive, Reformed churches have participated in the exportation of Western values, confusing, at times, the gospel with Western agendas. Reformed churches are called "protestant" as an indication of the protesting role they played against monarchy, hierarchy and clericalism at the time of the Protestant Reformation. Protestant churches were the nemesis of the established churches. However, when they became mainline churches themselves (and in some cases even the established church, such as in South Africa), sometimes they lost their protesting edge and became clients of the new status quo, often too eager to be seen as such, enjoying the status – or the illusion of such a status—as a respectable partner with the state in the affairs of society.³

The challenge for the Reformed tradition is to affirm cultural pluralism at the same time that it struggles with the prophetic role of the church within each culture. The church speaks from a perspective that is engaged. As a partner in the process of globalization, the church strives to be an agent of humanization of the world.

In Hope for a Global Future: Toward Just and Sustainable Human Development the 208th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (1996) "urges that the multiple cultural expressions of people's spirituality be recognized and respected as important for cultural identity and human development," and

acknowledges with deep regret that economic expansion and modernization in the less-developed countries of the south, furthered by northern governments and corporations, have often proceeded in ways that have demeaned local cultures, disrupted community support systems and community cohesion, displaced small-scale and

subsistence agriculture, ignored traditional knowledge and wisdom, and degraded the natural resource base."

The report goes on to say "these violations of the norms of solidarity, sustainability, and justice stand in the way of concrete realizations of the goal of just and sustainable human development."⁴

What is Culture?

From a culture struggling with the rapid changes prevailing in the world today, there comes the gift of this poem/song:

*There are days when we feel that we are like
someone who has departed or died. . .
suddenly we got stuck
or perhaps the world moved away.
We want to have a say,
we want to determine our destiny,
but lo, there comes the treadmill
and it drags our destiny away.
...We stand against the trend
as long as we can resist
...we cultivate a most beautiful
rose bush
but there comes the treadmill
and takes our rose bush away.⁵*

"...we cultivate a most beautiful rose bush."
Gardening. Horticulture.

What is culture? How does culture and the economy relate to each other? Is culture a by-product of the economy, as some social philosophers believe? Can the economy "take our rose bush away?" Or is culture prior to and a condition for the economy as others propose? Which comes first? What do we mean when we say "culture"? In what voice do we speak?

Whether or not one can speak of culture in a completely objective, detached way is a question debated by social scientists and philosophers alike. As a Christian church we are committed to *understanding* cultural issues as best we can, even as we *stand under* cultural assumptions in the process. In *Building Community Among Strangers*, the Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy adopted the following definition of culture:

Culture is a system of values, beliefs, and practices, and knowledge that develop when groups of people are in relationship to each other. It creates the shared understandings of the larger group. This includes a complex of language, values, and philosophy that are represented through symbols, including material objects, used to create identity and communication.⁶

To think of culture as a system signals an awareness of the rigorous internal logic that rules the relationship of each variable of the system to the whole; otherwise those variables would not be a system but a mere collection of more or less disjointed pieces. To say that culture is a system implies that the parts are related to each other in a meaningful way; this meaningful relationship among the various variables is the logic of the system, the "shared understandings of the larger group," without which a particular variable would not fit. This does not mean, however, that all elements of a cultural system are hermetically self-enclosed. There are many expressions of cultures that can be easily transplanted into other cultures. Music, cuisine, architecture, etc., have traveled for millennia from one culture to another. So, in order to disentangle some of the complexity of the cultural aspects of the globalization of the economy, it will be useful to distinguish between softer aspects of culture (such as popular music, ethnic food, etc) from the harder cultural constructs that form a worldview (such as national identity, values orientation and organization of time), even though to some extent, this is an artificial distinction. There is a global cultural exchange in which, juxtaposed to the greater traffic of ethnic cultural products in the developed world, a rapid expansion of a rationalized worldview is flowing from the developed world to developing countries. Ethnic cultural products are the "faces of culture," while the worldview that structures cultures is the "heart of culture" or the "cultural core." In this study paper, we shall refer to "ethnic cultural production" as "soft elements" and to "cultural core" as "hard elements" of culture.

How do we define "cultural core?"

Princeton anthropologist Clifford Geertz has articulated a concept of culture as "an instinct-substituting technology." While animals without a complex nervous system are guided toward their environment primarily by their instincts the

human animal is guided toward the environment primarily by acquired knowledge. Acquired knowledge is possible because of the development of the human cortex, which, however, developed with the development of culture itself.⁷

Homo sapiens, the human species, therefore, is human only as it is also a knowing species. Geertz is convinced that "undirected by culture patterns—organized systems of significant symbols—man's behavior would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless."⁸ So, culture, while created by humans, in a very real sense also defines who humans are. Without humans no culture, but at the same time, without culture no humans.⁹

Geertz's work may suggest a parallel in computer technology, in which one generation of hard ware is coupled with its generation of soft ware that generates technology for the next generation of hard ware and its soft ware, and so on. The hard ware/soft ware analogy is very limited because existing computer technology is far from emulating the functions of the human brain and humans are social beings, which affect each other in ways that machines still do not. This analogy, however, has found expression in productions of the western cultural industry, such as the hit movie *The Matrix*. The analogy is useful because it illustrates the internal logic of a system of symbols.

A Presbyterian from Latin America, world-famous theologian, turned psychoanalyst, turned poet, Rubem Alves, talks about culture as a text written on our flesh.¹⁰ Alves likes to quote the gospel of John: "the Word became flesh." Perhaps the Evangelist, the Latin American poet and the Princeton scientist all agree: the word becomes flesh and makes us human.

The definition of culture adopted in "Building Community" names (a) language, (b) values and (c) philosophy as key variables of a culture. It makes reference also to symbols "including material objects" that are used to create identity and communication.

What do we mean by these variables?

Language

Language, as a part of the "cultural core," is at the heart of culture. What people do with language—narrative, poetry, song, plays, etc.—are soft expressions of a culture; they are faces of culture. Languages are systems of verbal symbols—vocal and/or written—organized by particular rules (grammar) and used by particular communities in order to develop and communicate their thoughts and affections. Languages are always evolving; new words are always emerging, new meanings are attributed to existing words and some words eventually fall out of usage. The way people talk about things also changes: no one would discuss race relations today as it was discussed fifty years ago; the choice of words and symbols exchanged in that conversation have shifted so much that the old race relations language does not make sense any more.

Languages frame what communities' say, think, or do. Ludwig Wittgenstein said, "The limits of my language are the limits of my world."¹¹ Clifford Geertz illustrates this with a reference to languages such as the Arapesh, "in which you must enumerate by saying 'one, two, two and one, one dog (i.e., four), one dog and one, one dog and two, one dog and two and one, two dogs. . . .etc'" which makes counting so troublesome that "people find it such an effort to go beyond two dogs and two dogs and two dogs (i.e., twenty four) that they refer to all larger quantities as 'a lot'.¹² In those cases, it is impossible even to translate certain math concepts from other languages into that one without actually adding words to it, that is, without changing this particular characteristic of the language. Scientists create new words all the time in order to name their discoveries and then use the new words to explore new discoveries, which they also name with new words. Without re-inventing scientific language, science would stop. So also with cultures: languages are a lot more than the words spoken. Peter Berger says "people do not use language innocently. Every language carries with it a cultural freight of cognitive, normative, and even emotional connotations."¹³ Sometimes, it is necessary to insert a new word in the conversation in order to move it one step further.

Related to language and important in any culture is its net of non-verbal communication signs. The range of non-verbal systems of communication is sub-divided into various fascinating sub-fields. "Body language" is probably the most recognizable of the non-verbal systems.

Values

Values are also found at the heart of culture; values are part of the cultural core. Theories of value have occupied philosophers and ethicists in debates over what is or is not a value, how to organize them, and so on. Some even question whether speaking of "values" is not a trap that pre-determines certain outcomes of the conversation. A conversation over "values" is a conversation disciplined by an economy of calculation and comparison, even when the content of the conversation is something as benign as works of art. Introductions to theories of value deal with issues like "types of values" (e.g., material values, aesthetic values, religious values, etc), axiology, or hierarchy of values (e.g., whether a type of value takes precedence over another, etc). . . . When we speak of cultural values we are referring to those principles that set directions for cultures. After researching five communities on their orientation toward human nature, the relationship of humans to nature, orientation toward time, activity orientation and orientation toward human relationships, anthropologists Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Stodtbeck offered the following definition:

Value orientations are complex but definitely patterned (rank-ordered) principles, resulting from the transactional interplay of three analytically distinguishable elements of the evaluative process—the cognitive, the affective, and the directive elements – which give order and direction to the ever-flowing stream of human acts and thoughts as these relate to the solution of "common human" problems.¹⁴

Cultural assumptions about the nature of human nature (whether there is such a thing as "human nature," whether such a nature would be essentially good or essentially evil, whether human nature is changeable or not) lay at the heart of much debate about how to order society and how to conduct economic affairs. Assumptions about "human nature" are also at the heart of assumptions about the nature of the

relationship between humans and the rest of nature. Is the interaction between humans and the rest of nature good or bad, should humans subjugate nature or seek harmony with it? Such assumptions also relate to time orientation, activity orientation and the nature of the relationships of humans to each other.

Time and space orientations are cultural variables clearly affected by the globalization of the economy. There are some well-known, classic notions of time, such as linear versus circular perceptions of time and tense orientation, i.e., orientation toward the past, orientation focused on the present or orientation toward the future.¹⁵ Social scientists have developed innumerable tools to define and measure different concepts of time and their connections to social relations. How flexible are the temporal structures of any given community? What time card trumps the others (e.g., are interpersonal relations subordinate to the present schedule or vice-versa?), and so on. Rabbi Abraham Heschell spoke about "the architecture of time" as a paradigm of a culture. To him, the Jewish temple that neither the Romans nor the Nazis could destroy – and that has preserved the Jewish people over millennia of persecution – is the Jewish observance of the Sabbath and the high holy days.¹⁶ The amount of time invested in the study of time is evidence of its importance for the understanding of cultures.

Regarding space, British political scientist Anthony Giddens has defined globalization as "the intensification of global relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa."¹⁷ Giddens is a leading analyst of the connectivity emerging with the globalization of the economy and its impact on the compression of social space and social time.

Philosophy

How people think what they think is another core cultural issue. Particular expressions of a philosophy of life are the faces of a given culture; its soft aspect, easier to grasp, challenge or engage. Post-industrialized western societies are characterized by highly disciplined systems of education, a specialized work force and a rationalized organization of time. Other cultures work with more associative, affective, holistic

processes or logic. Some cultures are more inductive and others are more deductive. Some are more abstract, some more concrete. Alphabetical cultures tend to be more abstract and linear (perhaps a result of the linear act of writing and reading which is a concrete exercise in abstraction). Cultures can be pre-alphabetical, alphabetical, and post-alphabetical (as is the case in societies where reading is replaced by television and other audio-visual media). Philosophy also relates to tradition, national character and other symbols of people's identity. The "American Way of Life" is a philosophy of life, as is the Japanese way, the French way, or whatever other "national" way. National identity is one of the characteristics of culture most vulnerable to the globalization of the economy for reasons that will be spelled out in the sections to follow.

Other clusters of cultural values can be grouped under "folkways and mores." Folkways and mores refer to the dos and don'ts within a culture.¹⁸ With the globalization of the economy researchers are paying more attention to folkways' and mores' implications for business, such as how much "get acquainted" time is needed in a given place before one can get to the point. Folkways and mores are mostly "soft" elements of culture, usually translatable and negotiable. They are not easily translatable and negotiable, however, when the core cultural system of which they are an expression is inconsistent with another core cultural system.

What is Globalization?

The notion of a 'global economy' emerged in the 1980s in the business schools of Harvard, Columbia, Stanford and other U.S. universities. It was the work of international business strategists like Kenichi Ohmae and M. E. Porter that gained academic currency for the concept.¹⁹ The concept quickly made its debut in the English language international financial and economic press and in no time was adopted by the neo-liberal political discourse. Dr. Gordon Douglass articulated a thorough descriptive definition of globalization in the first paper of this series.²⁰

The inter-connections between globalization, the economy and culture are generating significant interest academic, business and government circles. Following are some of the issues and concepts emerging in this field.

A Global "Melting Pot"?

Is the globalization of the economy fostering greater cultural diversity across the globe or is it generating a worldwide homogenization of cultures? Students of this issue talk about "complex connectivity,"²¹ "disjuncture and difference,"²² "creolization," "hybridization," "deterritorialization," and other such concepts that resist oversimplifications.

In "Four Faces of Global Culture"²³ Boston University's sociologist Peter Berger identifies four "cultures" that compete against each other on a global scale. His four types are: (a) the "Davos culture," or international business culture; (b) the "McWorld Culture," or global popular culture; (c) "Faculty club international," or world intellectual culture; and, (d) "New Religious movements," or popular religious culture.

The "Davos culture," named after the annual World Economic Summit meeting in the Swiss mountain resort of Davos, represents the "international culture of business and political leaders." Berger warns against a simplification of the model. The type is not a reference to those who attend Davos only but to the millions who identify with Davos and would like to be invited. They learn "the appropriate behavior and acceptable opinions of this club" in what sociologists call "anticipatory socialization." To the Davos club belong not only Fortune 500 CEOs but also fifth rate bank branch managers making U.S.\$100 a week and sub-employed lawyers in third world countries who burp mispronounced English words and argue passionately for support of IMF policies.

The "McWorld" culture is the label Berger gives to the wide spread acceptance of the McWorld type of values. One of Berger's researchers, Tamotsy Aoki, anthropologist at the Graduate Institute of International Policy Studies in Tokyo, came up with the expression "fast-foodization" of daily life, referring by it not only the changes in Japanese eating habits but also in fashion. Aoki refers to the growing consumption of T-shirts and jeans in Japan as the "fast-foodization of clothing."

The "Faculty Club International" represents the culture of the Western intelligentsia and is carried by academic networks, foundations, NGOs and some governmental and

intergovernmental agencies. It promotes "the ideas and behaviors invented by Western (mostly American) intellectuals, such as the ideologies of human rights, feminism, environmentalism, and multiculturalism..."²⁴

The "New Religious Movements" type covers the phenomenon of fast expanding religions of conversion. Berger takes special notice of "evangelical Protestantism, especially in its Pentecostal version," as a most significant movement serving ("mostly inadvertently" as he puts it) as a vehicle of cultural globalization. Berger sees a relation to Max Weber's "Protestant ethic" in the rapid growth of this type of religion and the fast expansion of capitalism around the world. As a social scientist, Berger asserts that his analysis is not a value judgment. "One may deplore or welcome" such influences.²⁵

Peter Berger concludes that "there is indeed an emerging global culture, and it is indeed heavily American in origin and content." To him "this is not the only game in town. . . but it is the biggest game going on and it will stay that way for the foreseeable future."²⁶

Aarjun Appadurai has formulated a more systemic approach. He looks at globalization as a net of related but distinctive networks, which he describes as landscapes that intersect with each other in the development of worldwide connections.²⁷ Appadurai's landscapes are, in his words, the building blocks of "*imagined worlds*" constituted by the "historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe." He identifies five such landscapes or dimensions of global connections: (a) ethnoscaples, (b) mediascapes, (c) technoscapes, (d) financescapes, and (e) ideoscapes. Ethnoscapes refer to the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in which we live: "tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and individuals." Mediascapes describe both "the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information (newspapers, magazines, television stations, and film-producing studios), which are now available to a growing number of private and public interests throughout the world, and the images of the world created by these media." Technoscapes is the landscape of global technology and the fact that technology, both

high and low "now moves at high speeds across various kinds of previously impervious boundaries." Financescapes cover the disposition of global capital, now more mysterious, rapid, and difficult to follow than ever before, "as currency markets, national stock exchanges, and commodity speculations move megamonies through national turnstiles at blinking speed, with vast, absolute implications for small differences in percentage point and time units." Ideoscapes are concatenations of images, but they are also political. "These ideoscapes are composed of elements of the Enlightenment world view, which consists of a chain of ideas, terms, and images, including *freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation*, and the master term *democracy*."

Global Communications/Informatization of the Economy

The globalization of the economy has fostered and benefited from three parallel developments in communications: (a) the conglomeration of media networks, (b) the commodification of information (i.e., the transformation of information in a marketable commodity to be bought and sold for a profit), and (c) the informatization of the economy.

(a) Conglomeration of media networks: on June 2nd, 2003 the FCC reversed previous media markets regulations, allowing from now on the ownership and control of major newspapers, radio stations and television stations in the same media market by the same owner. As alarming as such deregulation may be, media conglomeration, however, is much more complex than the monopolization of communications at the local level. It involves also a growing international expansion of western-based media outlets (CNN is in 130 countries and MTV is not far behind) and the increasing concentration of ownership of the entertainment production industry by the media outlets.²⁸ Already in 1992, of the one hundred largest diversified service companies listed by *Fortune*, "eleven specialize in entertainment, telecommunications and information services" and of these, eight are American, one is Japanese, one British, and one Canadian.²⁹ Ben Bagdikian has listed 23 top corporations that control "most business in daily newspapers, magazines, television, books and motion pictures."³⁰ Mega media mergers point to the way of hardware manufacturers and delivery

system owners buying out companies that control creative products.³¹

How do these mergers affect culture in developing countries? The most obvious impact is the reduction of cultural production to cultural reproduction with all the dreadful implications that such mechanical reproduction generates. In India, pop star Babydoll Alisha sings Madonna songs in Hindi.³² In Brazil, where BMG owns Ariola Discos and, with it 55 percent of the market, local artists fear that they are losing their space to canned imports from the United States, while school children decorate their backpacks with cheap pictures of Michael Jackson.

In an interview conducted by the World Ministries Division of the General Assembly Council of the P.C. (U.S.A.) the Rev. Dr. Kim Yong-Bok, from Korea observed that:

The cultural market invades the whole human consciousness; and the human consciousness is colonized commercially. The visual, video and audio arts fill the virtual market as well as the actual market. The culture of recreation and games dominates in the market. Telecommunication via hi-tech media and cybernetic process flood the market, subjugating human consciousness with cultural commodities.³³

(b) Commodification of information: at the same time, the commodification of information has resulted in a significant reduction in coverage of international news in the U.S. American market. The *American Journalism Review* documented in the 90s that "international news coverage in most of America's 1,500 mainstream papers has almost reached the vanishing point."³⁴ News Magazines are not doing any better. "Time cut its foreign report from 24 percent to 14 percent; *Newsweek* from 22 percent to 12; *US News & World Report* went from 20 percent foreign coverage to 14. And in the decade of the '90s, the major networks cut their foreign news content by two-thirds. In the '80s, 40 percent of the three network news programs were devoted to foreign news. Ten years later the figure had slipped to below 12."³⁵ What drives this trend? The market. "The market," however, is not only the reading public; a most significant part of the market for the newspaper industry is the industry's corporate investors.³⁶

(c) Informatization of the Economy: in the post-industrial economy all economic activity is dependent on *infromatica*, the technology of information gathering, management and interpretation.³⁷ The informatization of the economy includes the collection of data, from marketing research on consumer preference, to highly classified quality control protocols, etc. Informatica includes also computer technology designed to manage information. It includes socio-political techniques of classification of information, i.e., techniques to determine which information, and how much of it, may be appropriate to release to any party (public or private) at any given moment. Informatization applies to industry (while Ford used to make cars and then market them to a given public, Toyota's marketing includes pre-design preferences research³⁸), it applies to entertainment (pre-design research is widely used by the cultural industry), politics (Gallop and other polls), and even the military (see below "Global Spectrum Dominance").

Culture and Knowledge as Common-Wealth versus Private Property

At the end of the "Uruguay Round" of GATT negotiations, which converted GATT into the World Trade Organization, a conflict emerged between western interests, represented primarily by the U. S. Office of Science and Technology and the Council of Economic Advisers, on the one hand, and developing world governments, on the other. The conflict was about "intellectual property rights." Western interests prevailed. The Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which force all countries to honor the northern interpretation of patent rights, was imposed. The dispute continues. The United States claims its corporations lose \$202 million a year in royalty payments for agricultural chemicals and \$2.5 billion in pharmaceuticals from Third World countries that have not recognized patents for intellectual property. However, an analysis by the Rural Advancement Fund International (RAFI) of Canada has demonstrated that when the long history of plant-breeding by other cultures is accounted for in the research and development of new agricultural technologies, "the United States would rightfully owe the Third World's farmers \$302 million annually for royalties on farmers' seeds that the United States now uses and \$5.1 billion for pharmaceuticals now in U.S. drug stores."³⁹

Vandana Shiva and Radha Holla-Bhar provide an illustration of this claim by Third World critics in an article, provocatively titled, "The Theft of the Neem Tree." This tree is a natural resource found in the drier areas of India, used as timber, fuel and medicine, which India tradition also regards as an ecological resource, "as a cure for ailing soils, plants, and livestock." W. R. Grace "discovered" the Neem tree, and "having garnered their patents and with the prospect of license from the EPA, Grace set about manufacturing and commercializing the product by establishing a base in India."⁴⁰

The practice of acquiring knowledge from indigenous cultures on the use of biological resources is called "bio-prospecting." Bio-prospectors buy traditional information from individuals in indigenous communities and then commercialize their commodity through industry. The controversy resides in the nature of such transactions. "The rationale is that, by compensating indigenous peoples for sharing knowledge and biological resources, bioprospecting increases the individual or private value of these resources and promotes conservation."⁴¹ The complication, however, is that indigenous knowledge belongs to a whole community and the prospector obtains such knowledge in transactions governed by the commercial rules of industrialized societies, including a very particular notion of property.

Industrialized societies make their business to designate authorship; tribes and ethnic communities develop knowledge in ways that are much more diffuse, confused, ambiguous and socially distributed.⁴² In industrialized societies, knowledge is regarded as alienable, for example, a commodity that can be bought and sold by individuals. Copyright laws are designed to protect individuals and corporations and their creations. The application of such concepts to transactions with non-industrial societies is, at best, problematic because characteristics that are usually associated with property, either material or intellectual, ("boundedness, continuity, authorship, homogeneity") are especially difficult to apply to culture.

Bio prospecting is one side of the unequal relationship between international businesses and indigenous communities. The other side of this equation is the marketing of patented

biological products—primarily seeds—to those communities. Current law recognizes the claims of ownership of intellectual property of biological resources by companies such as Monsanto, Novartis, and PPL. Such recognition forbids farmers from saving their seeds or sharing them with neighbors—millennial practices of agricultural societies around the world. Monsanto has hired detectives to chase farmers who might be engaging in such "theft."⁴³

The Expansion of Industrial Agriculture (a case from India)

The impact of the expansion of industrial agriculture on non-western economies and cultures is another area of significant disagreement over the globalization of the economy. Industrial agriculture, governed by the profit motif, deals with crops primarily as export commodities. This approach has two concurrent and mutually enforcing consequences for local agriculture: on the one hand, farmers are encouraged to switch from traditional crops for local consumption to crops that promise higher profits; on the other hand, local markets are also pressured to begin importing agricultural products industrialized elsewhere. Recent developments in India illustrate this process.

In semi-arid areas of India such as Warangal in Adhara Pradesh, farmers who traditionally grew paddy, pulses, millet, oilseeds and vegetable crops, are encouraged by transnational agro-businesses to switch over to cotton. Within ten years Warangal farmers nearly tripled the amount of land for the cultivation of what is called the "white gold." At the same time, farmers switched from using naturally pollinated seeds to hybrids that need to be purchased every year and which demand also more use of pesticides because hybrids are more vulnerable to pests. While expenditures on pesticide in the district were \$2.5 million for the entire decade of the 1980s by 1997 those expenditures were up to \$50 million. Poor peasants became quickly indebted to the corporations. "Thus, the corporations have become money lenders, extension agents, seed suppliers, and pesticide salesmen rolled into one. As a result peasants have become buried under the weight of unpayable debt."⁴⁴

The other side of the expansion of industrial agriculture is the hijacking of local markets by

international exports as illustrated by the takeover of soybean oil imports in Northern India, previously (until 1999) supplied by local mustard oil,⁴⁵ and the monopoly of local production by transnational agro-business. "This trend is moving the country toward an agricultural economy in which only a small number of people are involved—and only as tractor drivers and pesticide sprayers. All other functions of farmers—as maintainers of bio-diversity, stewards of soil and water, and seed breeders—are destroyed."⁴⁶

Severe burdens are imposed on local life-style by the industrialization of agriculture, the switch to export crops, and the "opening" of local food markets to foreign products. A housewife in Bombay reports, "we are eating half of what we used to after food prices doubled in the last year. Even *dal* is a luxury now. After milk prices increased, I stopped buying milk as well."⁴⁷ A change in dietary habits, forced by rapid economic change, is also a change imposed on the culture.

Globalization of the Economy and the Plight of Family Farming in the U.S.A.

The 214th General Assembly (2002) adopted the resolution "We Are What We Eat"⁴⁸ as a response to the farming crisis in the United States, with special focus on the plight of family farmers. The background section of the resolution names concrete economic factors affecting family farming. Key among these is "the global industrialization of agriculture that enables food commodities to be raised in the least expensive setting, but often causing a loss to farmers both in this and other countries."⁴⁹

Farmers and ranchers, who remain in business, face a variety of issues, including the following: the increasing concentration of agricultural power held by large corporations creates an environment open to manipulation in farm production as well as agricultural research, food processing, marketing, and sales. This concentration of power decreases competition for farm family products and drives many family farmers out of business. This concentration of power results in agricultural decisions being made in corporate boardrooms rather than within the farming communities. Markets within the United States have become uneven. A few corporations control packing and processing

markets. Anti-monopoly legislation, including the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, is not being applied to agriculture and food processing or production. Market prices are not made public. Family farmers are not able to compete in this uneven playing field.

At the same time, a number of the larger agricultural corporations have invested in other countries, set up production, and are selling processed foods.

The international trade agreements that have benefited transnational corporations in India also benefit them in the United States. This is the globalization of the economy: the internationalization of the economic model crafted by the transnational corporations for their benefits regardless of the fate of traditional and/or alternative models.⁵⁰

A major change in the way farmers do business is that before this increase in corporate power, U.S. farmers/ranchers delivered their commodities to local markets where prices were published, but now they go to markets where prices are not known and where grain and livestock move through a system controlled by persons in distant boardrooms, who have no acquaintance with their community and people. The concentration of power in agribusiness is forcing many farmers/ranchers out of business, while others continue as contract workers, "piece workers" for these large corporations. The globalization of the economy is robbing American family farmers of a free market.

Family farmers are going through a cultural convulsion—if not extinction.

At the heart of family farm culture is "farm pride."⁵¹ An important aspect of farm pride is the possibility of gaining or losing honor through one's achievements or behavior. Here the industrialization of agriculture magnifies also the dark side of pride. Competition and envy lay just under the surface. A rural pastor reports that as a farmer in his parish lost his land, instead of organizing to help the family in distress, "church folks lined up to get a piece of the action. One after another asked him or his wife, 'Are you planning to sell the elevator? What are you going to do with the combine?'..."⁵² Another report pictures the complete reversal of a community ethic of mutual trust and honor. "We have lost

the ability in the farm community to work together for a common good and a common goal."⁵³ In the words of older farmers, "the co-operative practices have been replaced by intense, even 'cannibalistic' competition." At the same time, increasing mechanization of farming has rendered the old fashioned culture of helping neighbors either unnecessary (one-person can farm vast areas alone) or inadequate (when the equipment brakes down it takes a technician to fix it).⁵⁴

Deterritorialization

"Deterritorialization" is the decoupling of institutions and culture from territory. Money and territory have been twin symbols of cultures from times immemorial. Until recently a country's territory contained its currency and its government regulated the country's currency. With the emergence of global capital, this is no longer the case.

Global capital began to emerge after World War II, when U.S. military installations, government aid programs and corporations spent billions in U.S. currency in other countries, creating a massive outflow of U.S. dollars to Europe and Asia. By the 1970s "for every dollar U.S. banks were lending to non-Americans from their domestic bank offices, they were lending six or seven more from offshore facilities that collectively came to be called Euromarket," creating what Richard Baret and John Cavanagh call "homeless money."⁵⁵ The new feature of the Euromarket is that "the money is denominated in a currency different from the official currency where the deposits are located."⁵⁶ The buildup of this pool of money soon became a link for previously disconnected financial markets around the world. The introduction of high tech tools into the banking industry enabled financial institutions to move funds at the speed of light virtually anywhere in the world. "In this cybertech globalized world, money has become free of its place and . . . from the connections to its former source of value: commodities and services. Money itself is the product that money buys and sells."⁵⁷ And so was born "international capital,"⁵⁸

As the neo-liberal economic model gains territory through WTO agreements first world nations begin to be affected also by such fast transfer of funds, increased independence from

local government regulations and greater control of the markets.⁵⁹ The international financial institutions—constituted of the main central banks, international banks, transnational corporations, insurance companies, pension funds, etc.—move trillions of dollars around the world every year. The result of such movement is a fostering of an ever-growing interdependence among the institutions and less dependence on local economies. U.S. mutual funds and pension funds work with about U.S. \$8 trillion a year; European funds run around U.S. \$6 trillion. The international currency exchange has topped U.S. \$1 trillion daily, more money than the exchange reserves of all the central banks in the world together.⁶⁰ In this environment of national markets inter-connected in real time, international investors and lenders, including the two major multilateral financial institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, grow in power and influence.⁶¹ Recent NAFTA and GATT agreements provide legal structures for this growing deterritorialization of capital.

As this paper is being drafted, Congress is debating the "Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act," introduced by Representative Richard Neal (D-MA) designed to eliminate "corporate inversion," the practice of corporations to incorporate in Bermuda and other international tax haven, thus maneuvering loop-holes for corporations to duck social responsibilities. Jobs are also exported. Even if a foreign accent is not detected when speaking with a billing representative for a credit card provider or phone company, the representative may be responding from across the globe. "That's because the services industry is shifting more back room operations to India, where labor costs are a fraction of those in the United States."⁶² Critical commentators see such a development as dragging first world countries into a race that undermines national interests:

U.S. corporations long ago learned how to pit states against each other in "a race to the bottom" to profit from whichever state would offer the most miserable wages, the most lax pollution standards, and the lowest taxes. Now, via NAFTA and GATT, multinational corporations can play this game at the global level.⁶³

Parallel to the deterritorialization of money is the deterritorialization of culture, fueled primarily

by population movements and the explosion in communications around the world. The globalization of the economy "brings laboring populations into the lower-class sectors and spaces of relatively wealthy societies," such as migrant workers in Switzerland and Saudi Arabia. "Some such guest-worker groups maintain continuous contact with their home nations, like the Turks, but others, like high-level South Asian migrants, tend to desire lives in their new homes, raising anew the problem of reproduction in a deterritorialized context."⁶⁴ Deterritorialization happens when communities migrate and people remain connected to each other and to the cultural industries of their home lands which are available to them around the globe through satellite, the internet and other simultaneous means as western canned TV sitcoms are available to their homelands. When Brazil won the world soccer cup in 2002, the 250,000+ Boston based Brazilian immigrant community took over the streets of Boston in an explosion of celebration—a carnival—that stopped traffic for various hours.

At the same time, deterritorialization occurs also in reverse, when a local culture is impacted by global communications. Anthropologist Christina Turner has done ethnographic work with Japanese female factory workers, 'women who have not "traveled" by any standard definition,' but whose "local culture" has been disturbed by global connections through TV, radio, commodities, tourists, armies, etc.⁶⁵

Kenichi Ohmae concludes that the globalization of capitalism is producing a "cross-boarder civilization" which renders the nation-state and national identity irrelevant. He argues that the global market is producing a "convergence of consumer tastes and preferences" and fostering a profound "cultural/generational" gap in Japanese society. The "Nintendo kids" (Japanese teenagers of the 1990's) have been socialized with a set of perceptions and social values that are radically different from their parents and grandparents. The technological modality of connectivity (the use of computers, computer games and interactive multimedia) has produced a generation of Japanese youth for whom "everything can be explored, rearranged, reprogrammed."

"AMERICAN CULTURE (AND GOODS) THRIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA" was the *New York Times*' headline announcing new investment possibilities as South Africans prepared for their first interracial free elections. Black South Africans are described sitting in a "Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, sipping Coca-Cola and listening to a Whitney Houston tape."⁶⁶

Developed countries enjoy a greater traffic of ethnic cultural products (i.e., "cultural faces"), such as food, clothing, music and other forms of arts. Ethnic foods compete for a piece of the market in thousands of "food courts" and five star restaurants where the consumer can buy Mexican fajitas, Chinese lo mein, Greek gyros, Syrian kibes, Japanese beef teriyaki, Italian pizzas, U.S. American cheeseburgers, and dozens of other choices. One does not need to be in Italy or in Brazil to enjoy a strong cup of coffee, cappuccino, latte, or espresso. The same variety is not available in less affluent markets for obvious reasons. Ethnic music has its own market within immigrant groups; some ethnic music finds space in the wider market from time to time either on its own (like Mexican La Bamba in the United States) or as it is appropriated by mainstream artists (like Brazilian, traditional Andean or South African rhythms adopted by U.S. American artists).

Deterritorialization relates also to another major aspect of the globalization of the economy, the decoupling of nation from state.

Nation/State (no longer nation-state?)

The link between nation and state has been taken for granted since its establishment with the peace of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Year War in 1648. The peace of Westphalia was about the stability of the relationship between a single government over any given territory. Until then Europe had been terrorized by conflicting claims over its territories by princes waging religious and civil wars. The peace enabled the creation of territorialized states with the recognition of governments with the exclusive authority to establish compulsory laws for its populations and the power to enforce those laws with the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in their territories. Territory, therefore, was connected to the authority and power of the state in two related manners: (a) total authority within its territory, and (b) autonomy in relation to

outside agents.⁶⁷ Later with the emergence of the liberal and democratic state those two characteristics of the state were preserved.

However, the emergence of the liberal state and democracy fostered a more profound sense of citizenship. On the one hand, the nation-state developed the ideology of nationalism, which articulated certain obligations of the citizen toward the state, including "love of country," certain symbols of national identity (common language and sometimes a common religious orientation), loyalty (especially in times of war), and others; on the other hand, the citizenry were told to expect from the state protection against foreign aggression, domestic welfare and social peace. Nationalism, with its cultural instruments (narrow sense of national interest framed by specific political and historical variables, celebration of national folklore, promotion of national art, etc) together with other historical developments, helped expand and deepen national sovereignty. The culture of national sovereignty transformed the political map of the world through the formation of new states and the dissolution of others.⁶⁸ The nation-state ideology has had its critics since 1648 and many would celebrate its demise.

New challenges to existing nation-state structures of governance are generated by the globalization of the economy. "Under WTO rules, for example, certain *objectives* are forbidden to all domestic legislatures, including the U.S. Congress, the state legislatures, and county and city councils. These *objectives* include providing any significant subsidies to promote energy conservation, sustainable farming practices, or environmentally sensitive technologies."⁶⁹ Not only do the WTO rules supersede the authority of the state, the WTO's governance raises questions about the integrity of democratic institutions, such as open courts. The WTO dispute resolution system is a secret court in Geneva, to which only WTO tribunal members representing national governments have access. The WTO determines the qualifications of tribunal members. No citizens or media can even observe the proceedings and the tribunal is obliged to keep them confidential. If a member government discloses arguments it presented to the court it must edit out the arguments of the other party. "For U.S. citizens, the notion of delegating 'judicial' review to forums that do not

have the procedural safeguards of the U.S. federal and state judicial systems is troubling."⁷⁰

Kenichi Ohmae opens his article "The End of the Nation State" with the following provocation:

A funny—and, to many observers, a very troubling – thing has happened on the way to former U.S. President Bush's so-called "new world order": the old world order has fallen apart. Most visibly, with the ending of the Cold War, the long-familiar pattern of alliances and oppositions among industrialized nations has fractured beyond repair. Less visibly, but arguably far more important, the modern nation state itself—that artifact of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – has begun to crumble.⁷¹

Ohmae backs his conclusion with four arguments. "In the first place, these long-established, politically defined units have much less to contribute – and much less freedom to make contributions" to the economy. While in previous stages of the economy the nation-state had a more significant role to play in economic affairs, with the globalization of the economy "the workings of genuinely global capital markets dwarf their ability to control exchange rates or protect their currency..." And, "nation states have become inescapably vulnerable to the discipline imposed by economic choices made elsewhere by people and institutions over which they have no practical control."⁷² The nation state, therefore is "increasingly a nostalgic fiction."

From the perspective of the global economy, it makes no sense to speak of countries like Italy, Russia or China as a simple economic unit. Ohmae also points to the diffusion of global production. "Is an automobile sold under an American marque really a U.S. product when a large percentage of its components come from abroad?" Finally, Ohmae dismisses as a "jingoistic celebration of nationhood" any economic activity that wears a national label. His conclusion is that in today's borderless economy "there is really only one strategic degree of freedom that central governments have," and that one option is "to cede meaningful operational autonomy to the wealth-generating region states that lie within or across their borders, to catalyze the efforts of those region states to seek out global solutions, and to harness their distinctive ability to put global logic

first and to function as ports of entry to the global economy."⁷³

Critics of the demise of the nation-state include Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics, former Senior Vice President and Chief Economist for the World Bank and Herman Daly. Stiglitz writes:

Because in this model there is no need for government--that is, free, unfettered, "liberal" markets work perfectly--the Washington Consensus⁷⁴ policies are sometimes referred to as "neo-liberal," [. . .] a resuscitation of the laissez-faire policies that were popular in some circles in the nineteenth century.⁷⁵

Herman Daly in his farewell lecture to the World Bank in 1994 warned that the push to eliminate the nation-state's capacity to regulate commerce is "to wound fatally the major unit of community capable of carrying out any policies for the common good."⁷⁶

As we witness the loss of authority of the nation/state two troubling prospects emerge quietly in the horizon: (a) a return to a pre-Westphalia anarchy in which, in the absence of monopoly of authority over a given territory, nations may find themselves subjected to conflicting demands from competing powers, pretty much like the anarchy that preceded the Thirty Year War in the seventeenth century, or (b) the emergence of a new form of world government, not a government of elected representatives (like democratic nation-state) but a government of corporate interests that have already reached enough power to win legal legitimacy through international agreements in which the nation states surrender to those interests some of their most important responsibilities.

These prospects are not universally welcomed.

A "Clash of Civilizations?"

In 1997 Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington published, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.⁷⁷ As the title suggests, the author points to data that in his analysis signal dangerous indications of global conflicts triggered by seemingly irreconcilable structures of meaning and power represented by

distinct civilizations and their competition for territory, money and souls.⁷⁸ The title of the book seems to come from a warning written by Bernard Lewis, in "Roots of Muslim Rage" which Huntington quotes:

It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations--that perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival.⁷⁹

A recent episode of "Law and Order" pictures a young radical Muslim man as a sexually repressed woman-killer, prosecuted by an American female attorney in a court presided by an American female judge. Much characterization of Islam and Muslims by the entertainment industry in the West lends itself to the claim by some Muslims that the west wants to destroy Islam.

Radical Muslims, perhaps best represented by Muslim writer/philosopher/activist Sayyid Qutb, perceive the expansion of western dominated market and political models as conduits of values that undermine the integrity of Islam. This corruption, in their view, takes place on, at least, three levels: (a) political, (b) economic, and, (c) moral.

Western cultural agents often focus attention on Muslim's moral objections to western culture. The moral objections are the easiest to dismiss because they clash clearly with western cultural values. Radical Muslims object to the exposure of certain aspects of the human figure in public. Westerners see freedom of expression as a higher value (even though some western feminists have also denounced the commodification of the female body by the advertising industry). Radical Muslims believe in distinct roles for men and women in the affairs of society. Westerners believe in equality of men and women in the affairs of society (at least liberal Westerners do). The economic arguments are a lot more complex.

Conceived in the womb of the impoverished masses in the fertile crescent, Islam's doctrine of "Tawhid" (the belief in the unity of God and solidarity of the human family: that God is One in total harmony with creation, the Lord of history, that God is to be worshiped in radical surrender without reserve or rationalizations, etc.) is necessarily congruent with a world view in which politics and economics are framed by religion. Within this frame of reference we find the Quranic injunction against "riba"—the Muslim prohibition on profit making.⁸⁰ The doctrine of Tawhid does not mean that all persons in a Muslim society must be Muslims. (In fact, during the Muslim rule of the Iberic Peninsula, the Muslim rule protected Christians and Jews equally; in contrast to the persecution that the Jews suffered at the hand of the Christians before and after the Moore period.) A faithful Muslim rule is intended to preserve standards presumed by the Muslims to be consistent with the confession that only God is God and the human family is one. In the writings of radical thinker Qutb this is expressed as a radical call to individual freedom (a critique of the state without parallel in contemporary "liberal" western ideologies).⁸¹ Radical Islam is suspicious of the state. Governance is to be exercised mostly by local leaders and councils. Some few crimes are to be punished very severely so that freedom may be preserved.

The political corruption of Islam is seen as the increasing westernization of Muslim societies. At the heart of this corruption, from the Muslim perspective, is the western style codification of the law and the importation of western style democracy which undermines Shari'a law and justifies values that are offensive to God—such as representation of behavior considered immoral on public channels of communication and the opening of Muslim societies to market practices that promote profit and greed. Qutb and his followers call this separation of religion from social values a "hideous schizophrenia" promoted by the Christian west and lament its penetration of Islam.⁸²

British author Roger Scruton asks why we should blame Islam for rejecting Western technology, Western institutions, Western conceptions of religious freedom when all of these "involve a rejection of the idea on which Islam is founded – the idea of God's immutable

will, revealed once and for all to his prophet, in the form of an unbreachable and unchanging code of law."⁸³ William Pfaff also comments: "There is constant Western pressure on Islamic governments to conform to Western conceptions of human rights and promote free, critical religious and political thought. In short, they are to become us."⁸⁴ To Westerners, for whom Jeffersonian religious diversity is at the core of culture, the Muslim theocentric culture must be dismissed as archaic or tyrannical; Muslim culture must be wrong; it is inconceivable within the Western framework. Herein the antithesis most of the time concealed from our presumably all-inclusive post-modern eyes.

As Ira Rifkin concludes: "Globalization, with its emphasis on Laissez-faire capitalism, is in conflict with Islam's basic economic philosophy... For many Muslims, globalization is little more than neocolonialism, with the United States seen as its leading proponent. . ."⁸⁵

Many in the west, who are not either Muslim or radical, share in this analysis.

Global Spectrum Dominance and Homeland Security: Changes in U.S. American Culture

The full significance of September 11, 2001 is still to be determined by history. In the short run, the responses orchestrated by the government of the United States and the public acceptance of these initiatives seem to be replacing traditional U.S. American values with a whole new order of priorities. Two such initiatives need to be mentioned here: the new U.S. National Security Policy-Joint Vision 2020, published in 2002 by the U.S. Department of Defense and the new doctrine of homeland security, expressed in the "U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001."

Joint Vision 2020 offers a blueprint for how the U.S. military will fight and win the nation's wars over the next two decades. It describes "the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations—persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict."⁸⁶ "Full Spectrum Dominance" is defined as:

The label full spectrum dominance implies that U.S. forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations, and with access to and freedom

to operate in all domains -- space, sea, land, air and information.⁸⁷

Additionally, given the global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance.⁸⁸

The document reminds us of the military doctrine of the Roman Empire.⁸⁹

It is this new National Security Policy that justifies "preventive war" such as the war on Iraq and represents a significant change in U.S. military doctrine, which was framed in the past with "just war" theory. The "just war" tradition places a burden against war, except as a last resort and when other critical criteria are fulfilled. The doctrine of "preventive war" dismisses those criteria in function of a greater good.

In the Iraqi case, one of the U.S. administration's most credible reasons for the war was to bring democracy to Iraq. The President said repeatedly that this war was not for the U.S. to take over Iraqi oil. The U.S. American public must take the President at his word. His agenda is the democratization of Iraq (and the Middle East), not to grab oil for the U.S.A. Democratization, however, in the idiom of this administration, does not mean the will of the majority of Iraqis. One outcome that the U.S.A. cannot afford, for example, would be the formation of a fundamentalist Muslim government by the Shi'ite majority. What democracy means in neo-conservative parlance—in the language that the President speaks—is fewer government controls over the economy.

For Iraq, this means privatization of Iraqi oil. So, democratization of Iraq as a first step in the democratization of the Middle East, when understood in the context of the political language of the President and his neo-conservative advisors, means the removal of nationalistic and religious barriers to the globalization of the triumphant model of capitalism exported by the U.S.A. and the opening of those markets to its corporate agents. The President is telling the truth: the U.S. government is not taking over Iraqi oil; rather, what the U.S. government is doing with the use of the U.S. military is to open those markets—including oil—to private investors. Whether or not

such privatization may benefit the U.S. American consumers or the Iraqi people is irrelevant. The President told us what his agenda is in plain English. We must pay attention, give him credit and understand what he means. In this age of informatization sometimes meaning is lost in the glare of truth.

Critics of the new "preventive war" doctrine believe that it has the potential of changing the nature of international relations (providing a new rationale for war that may be claimed by other nations as well), and that it will increase the anxiety of other nations toward the U.S. with the probability of increased hostility toward the U.S. and its citizens, including more acts of terrorism. Such fears are countered by the administration with increased homeland security. The "U.S.A. Patriot Act" of 2001 (full title: "The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001") provides, among other things, for the secret detention of aliens if they are deemed dangerous by the Attorney General, the secret designation of organizations as terrorist on the basis of undisclosed evidence, and the expansion of government authority for search and surveillance. Harvard Divinity School's David Little comments:

In ways supplementary to the expanded emergency powers granted by the U.S.A. Patriot Act, and that raise related problems, the U.S. government has claimed the right to relax conventional civil protections in relation to three specific areas: subjecting aliens, arrested for immigration violations to secret deportation hearings; indefinitely detaining individuals considered potential material witnesses in terrorism cases, and indefinitely detaining American citizens regarded as "enemy combatants" on the side of terrorists, and denying them access to legal counsel.⁹⁰

Equally chilling and problematic for the U.S. American culture of civil liberties is the new authority given to the Office of Homeland Security to survey U.S. citizens' communications, including public library check out records, on-line research and other exchange of ideas. As democracy is exported through military means⁹¹ the U.S. American culture seems to import a growing tolerance for compromise on its traditional philosophy of government, individual freedoms and civil rights.

Time is Money: 24/7 Time Compression

At the core of cultures is their orientation toward time, their rhythms of work and rest, sacred time, family time, time in community and time for one self. Global connectivity, however, impresses a rationalized economy of time on cultures around the world, regardless of their own treasured rhythms and other time-related values. Anthony Giddens refers to globalization as "global relations that link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa."⁹² This is a new architecture of space and time. "The integration of financial markets is particularly significant. Information and communications technology has, of course, provided the architecture for globally connected capital markets..."⁹³ Not only is this a new architecture, it is an architecture that compresses previous spaces because of both the speed of its technology (now billions of dollars can be transferred with the click of a computer keyboard) and because of the autonomy of international capital.

Some economists speak of "vertical integration" to refer to the impact of global economic forces on local economies. Vertical integration takes place through market management by transnational businesses and by the interference of global financial institutions on national currencies. The structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF are designed to make local markets profitable for international capital. This approach impresses on local economies a pace of expected growth (i.e., productivity/profitability) equal to or better than competitors across the globe. It is a global marathon in which all run against all.

The pressure for ever-increasing productivity and its impact on the lives of first world people have been well demonstrated by economists like Juliet Schor, in *The Overworked American*. Schor documents the increase in work time for U.S. American workers, for the same life style, from 1969 to 1987, with figures like the following:⁹⁴

a. Hours worked per week (in market activity):

	1969	1987
All participants	39.8	40.7
Men	43.0	43.8
Women	35.2	37.0

b. Weeks Worked per year (in market activity):

	1969	1987
All participants	43.9	47.1
Men	47.1	48.5
Women	39.3	45.4

Looking at market and household workload together, Schor shows an increase in both:⁹⁵

Total Annual Hours Worked

	1969	1987	Change 69-87
Market hours			
All participants	1,786	1,949	163
Men	2,054	2,152	98
Women	1,406	1,711	305
Household hours			
All participants	889	888	-1
Men	621	689	68
Women	1,268	1,123	-145
Total Hours			
All participants	2,675	2,837	162
Men	2,675	2,841	166
Women	2,674	2,834	160

The increase in market hours results in less time for volunteer work and for leisure. Some call this phenomenon "time starvation."

Volunteer organizations, such as churches, have felt the impact of this "time starvation" on their membership as less and less people can afford to volunteer for non-paid work. Political scientist Robert Putnam looks at the impact of time starvation on political engagement. In *Bowling Alone* he measures the relationship between time to socialize (like bowling together) and other social activities such as engagement in political campaigns, etc. . . . and he concludes with alarm that in our culture more and more people are "bowling alone" because of the pressures of the market.⁹⁶ A concrete shift in the culture is that we no longer keep a common day of rest, which Presbyterians used to call "the Lord's Day" or "Christian Sabbath," and for which organized labor once fought hard.

Time compression emerged with the rationalization of labor and the rise of industrialization in Europe. The case of the British railroad system is a good illustration of that process. Since European cities and towns were all equipped with solar clocks, their time zones were determined by their own geographical locations. So, when a train

departed from London at 12:00 noon, it was not 12:00 noon in nearby towns and villages and that natural "disorder" caused the railroads enormous confusion in the scheduling of their times of arrival and departure. The solution was to establish time zones large enough for their traveling range and synchronize their clocks.⁹⁷

Obviously, when it is 12:00 noon in London it is not solar high noon everywhere in the London time zone. Natural time was replaced by conventional time in function of a rational need of the emerging transportation industry. Prior to industrialization the artisan impressed the rhythm of the human body to work, after industrialization the mechanical apparatus of the factory impresses on the body of the worker the rhythm of the machine. In *These Times*, Charles Chaplin dramatizes the transformation of the human body into a piece of equipment by representing the laughable effort of a factory worker to eat a piece of corn-on-a-cob which rotates automatically in front of him as he operates an industrial machine.

Today, cities and villages around the world are pressed by real time news and commercial transactions taking place anywhere in the globe; the global clock connects financial centers from Tokyo to London to New York and local rhythms of life are impressed by the presence of innumerable external times. The compounded times, the fact that we live under various clocks all running simultaneously, generates what some sociologists now call "compressed time," i.e., an experience of time in which a lot more happens at the same time all the time. Time is no longer local.

In a global economy 24/7 means that whatever may be happening across the globe at any time, may affect my income and my retirement plan. As the IMF policies are imposed on local economies, for example, as economies are "liberalized" and pension plans are privatized, people lose the option of not worrying about the economy 24/7. The periphery has been conquered by the international capital. Time is money. Local time is now compressed also by the central clock.

At the Vortex of Values: the Emergence of Messianic Materialism

Robert Putnam's description of the "bowling alone" syndrome is troubling, especially for institutions, like the church, that value community life. Volunteer associations have experienced the impact that time starvation has on people's ability to give time to non-marketable, mission work. Are we witnessing a conflict here between two competing cultural values: solidarity, on the one hand, and competition, on the other?

A Presbyterian minister from Korea spoke strong words about this issue:

In the process of globalization the market ideology ordained competition as the supreme virtue. Unlimited competition has become a fierce struggle for the survival of the fittest. This is a kind of new global social Darwinism. Traditional social contradictions and conflicts such as class, race, gender and ethnicity are intensified in the vortex of the unlimited competitions in the market, which dictate the whole social dynamics. Everyone is competing with everyone, and, therefore, a potential enemy in the market and society. This entails uncontrollable social chaos, which is highly violent. The weak in this society are victims and there is no security and protection, not to speak of social justice. There is almost no room for humane community in the vortex of the market.⁹⁸

Is the vortex of the market spinning a net of values that re-frame cultures in function of its own logic? Is the globalization of the economy not only an economic engine but also an engine that drags with its power also the symbolic exchanges in a global scale? Is there an alternative logic that needs to be articulated by those who want to build a "humane community"?

The reverse side of a culture that cannot count past twenty-four is a culture that can only count. A culture that can only count learns how to count one by one, two by two, five by five, ten by ten, by hundreds, by thousands, millions, billions, trillions and nauseum. Counting can be an obsession, and a compulsion, a self-enclosed logic, a monological view of the world—a view of the world as limited and limiting as that shaped by never counting higher than four. The tragedy is that neither culture, left undisturbed, sees its own limitations. Witness the people trapped in

the virtual culture of *The Matrix*! As the angel in Revelations says to a church: "You say, 'I am rich; I have acquired wealth and do not need a thing.' But you do not realize that you are wretched, pitiful, poor, blind and naked."⁹⁹

Global marketers will object that this is precisely the problem with developing world resistance to globalization. Their argument is that developing world people do not even know how miserable they are until they are exposed to first world information, goods and services, legal systems and market rules. Globalization is pursued as a mission.

Globalization of the Economy and Rationalization of Cultures

In *General Economic History*, Max Weber analyzes in great detail the various forms of "capitalisms" found in different periods of history and the many aspects of rationalizations that are crucial to the development of modern capitalism.¹⁰⁰ At the end of a thorough summary of his research of the diverse origins of modern capitalism, Weber elaborates the connection between the rationalization of economic factors and the rationalization of the spirit:

In the last resort the factor which produced capitalism is the rational permanent enterprise, rational accounting, rational technology and rational law, but again not these alone. Necessary complementary factors were the rational spirit, the rationalization of the conduct of life in general, and a rationalistic economic ethic.¹⁰¹

Comparing what he calls "modern capitalism" with the economic activities of the peasants, the guild craftsman and the capitalism of the adventurer who depends on "political opportunities and irrational speculation," Weber says that modern capitalism is "rationalized on the basis of rigorous calculation, directed with foresight and caution toward the economic success which is sought."¹⁰² In other words, without the rationalization of production there would be no modern capitalism as Weber defines it. The other forms of economic activities (the capitalism of the adventurer, mercantilism, etc.) are not exactly modern capitalism because the rational organization of production is lacking in those models.

Weber also states in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* that one of the causes of the rationalization of the spirit is precisely the rationalization of the economy.¹⁰³

Rationalization, in Weber's analysis, is characterized by four variables: (a) efficiency, (b) quantification, (c) predictability, and, (d) control (of people by rules, regulations and structures).¹⁰⁴ The emergence of rationalized systems marked a paradigm shift from previous systems in that rationalized systems—because of their efficiency and capacity for control—impose themselves on everyone. Weber was so alarmed about this that at the end of *The Protestant Ethic* he called this an "iron cage." Weber also cautioned that "rationalized" is not the same as rational. Systems that are efficient, quantifiable, predictable and controlling can also be totally insensitive to human needs and agency.

Rationalization variables—or fixes—in the globalization of the economy, abound, from the iron cage economic rules of the Washington Consensus—especially as imposed by the IMF uniformly on all types of economic cultures around the world—to the precise procedures designed by McDonalds for the preparation of their burgers. John Love offers the following description of a McDonalds manual: in it, McDonalds' employees

were instructed to put hamburgers down on the grill moving from left to right, creating *six rows of six patties* each. And because the first two rows were farthest from the heating element, they were instructed (and still are) to flip the third row first, then the fourth, fifth, and sixth before flipping the first two. [italics added]¹⁰⁵

As McDonalds has become a symbol of the westernization of the economy and McDonaldization has emerged as an academic neologism to refer to the cultural paradigm that accompanies the globalization of the economy, it may be hard to imagine any better parallel between the rationalization of the economy imposed by the IMF and the rationalization of cultures that go with it.

Conclusions and Questions

This is a brief introduction to some of the issues emerging in the studies and debates over the globalization of the economy and its

relationship to culture(s). As an introduction, it is intended as an invitation to further research and reflection. Perhaps a grid might be used? On one side of the grid, key elements of culture (such as language, values and philosophy) would be listed; on the other side of the grid, current developments in the globalization of the economy (such as media mergers, international flow of capital, time compression, etc) would be listed. What might emerge? Is the consolidation of media fostering greater reflection on the values that move the economy, for example?

It might be equally interesting to make a list of words/concepts that our ecumenical partners use generously in their discussions of globalization that remain virtually unknown to most of us (such as "alterity"¹⁰⁶). What would most Presbyterians think of the rules of the WTO, if they knew in some detail what those rules are? What would we say if the WTO ruled that one of our cities was in violation of WTO rules for banning chewing gum? Singapore was pressed by gum manufacturers, through the WTO, to lift its ban.

Questions for Reflection

1. What are the best values of the U.S. American culture that the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) should encourage its agents (missionaries, ecumenical partners, etc) to export to other countries? What are the elements of present day U.S. American culture that we, as Presbyterians, should ask our agents to prevent from exporting to other countries?
2. In what ways might people living in the U.S. American culture learn from other distinct and alternate cultures? What might we learn from African cultures? From Arab cultures? From the Russians? Other cultures?
3. What do we think the author of "Roda Viva" (poem/song in "what is culture?") means by the treadmill? What is the treadmill for him? What is the treadmill for us? Are we running the treadmill or is it running us?
4. The treadmill never stops. Does Christianity have any thing to offer a time-starving world?
5. Regarding core culture: how would we characterize the hard edges of a U.S. American culture? How would we distinguish it from Latin

American cultures? African cultures? Asian cultures? Other cultures? Would we agree with the statement that U.S. American culture is characterized by materialism and consumerism? Yes? No? Explain.

6. What about immigration laws in a global economy? Money moves across the globe at the click of a keyboard. Do we think that working people also should be allowed to move in and out of countries—to follow the money— (investors as well as unskilled workers) in search of opportunities and pursuit of happiness? How can we talk of "globalization of the economy" if people do not have the right to pursue their economic interests anywhere they wish in the globe?

7. Do we think that the U.S. American culture is oriented more toward the past, the present or the future? When we think about the future, what are our hopes and dreams for the future of the world? What are our fears, concerns? If the current trends continue, how do we think the world will be a hundred years from now? What about five hundred years from now?

8. What do we think would need to change now so that in the future our children and grand children may enjoy a world of peace, justice and equality for all? What do we need to do in order to build a culture of peace, justice and equality among the nations?

9. Do we think that the nation-state should be replaced by global institutions? What type of institutions? (the United Nations?, the World Trade Organization?, other?) Why? Why not? Is nationalism a good thing?

The Reformed tradition affirms cultural diversity as a matter of modesty. Reformed churches celebrate the increase in diversity of cultural products available in first world markets. At the same time, as far as the hard elements of culture are concerned, the commitment of Presbyterian churches to partnership in mission with churches in other nations, offers us an opportunity for genuine cultural exchange with communities in-formed by alternative worldviews, values and identity. Solidarity in mission transcends the temporal interests of any economic model.

In a pluralistic democracy communities of faith are radical witnesses to the fact that diversity, not uniformity, makes freedom meaningful. But diversity can be co-opted by collective self-interest, and western societies are especially vulnerable to the deception of soft diversity when that diversity is in fact enlisted at the service of a hard monological rationalization of life that does not tolerate native deviations or alternatives.

Endnotes:

- ¹ Pei-Chia Lan, "Among Women: Migrant Domestic and Their Taiwanese Employers Across Generations," in *Global Woman-- Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy*, edited by Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russel Hochschild (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002), p. 173.
- ² Rhacel Salazar Parreñas, "The Care Crisis in the Philippines: Children and Transnational Families in the New Global Economy," in *Global Woman*, p. 41.
- ³ For a thorough study of this metamorphosis from a protesting movement to an established church, see Rubem Alves, *Protestantism and Repression*, translated by John Drury and Jaime Wright (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985).
- ⁴ *Hope for a Global Future: Toward Just and Sustainable Human Development*, approved by the 208th General Assembly (1996), Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), p. 124.
- ⁵ "Roda Viva," by Chico Buarque de Holanda, Translated by Ruy Costa.
- ⁶ *Building Community Among Strangers: A Report on Racism, Social Class Division, Sex-based Injustices and Religious Intolerance and Conflict*. Approved by the 211th General Assembly (1999), Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) p. 10.
- ⁷ Geertz writes: "Culture, rather than being added on, so to speak to a finished or virtually finished animal, was ingredient, and centrally ingredient, in the production of that animal itself... The perfection of tools, the adoption of organized hunting and gathering practices, the beginnings of true family organization, the discovery of fire, and most critically, though it is as yet extremely difficult to trace it out in any detail, the increasing reliance upon systems of significant symbols (language, art, myth, ritual) for orientation, communication, and self-control, all created for man a new environment to which he was then obliged to adapt. As culture, step by infinitesimal step, accumulated and developed, a selective advantage was given to those individuals in the population most able to take advantage of it—the effective hunter, the persistent gatherer, the adept toolmaker, the resourceful leader—until what had been a small-brained protohuman *Australopithecus* became the large-brained fully human *Homo sapiens*." Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 47-48.
- ⁸ Geertz, p. 46.
- ⁹ Geertz, p. 49.
- ¹⁰ Rubem Alves, "Theopoetics: Longing and Liberation," in *Struggles for Solidarity: Liberation Theologies in Tension*, Ruy Costa and Lorine Getz, eds. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992).
- ¹¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford:Blackwell, 1958).
- ¹² Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretations of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 60.
- ¹³ Peter Berger, *Many Globalizations*. p. 3. Berger's point is an expression of the so-called Sapir-Whorf theory that "the real world is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group" and that "no two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality." For a modified approach see the philosophy of language of Rubem Alves in R. Costa's *Toward a Latin American Theology of Liberation*, (University Microfilms International, Michigan, 1989), p. 3.
- ¹⁴ Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (Row, Peterson and Co., Evanston and New York, 1961), p. 4.
- ¹⁵ For a more sophisticated introduction to studies on time as a social variable see *The Sociology of Time*, John Hassard, ed., St. Martin's Press, New York, 1990.
- ¹⁶ Abraham Heschell, *The Sabbath: Its Importance for Modern Man* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951).
- ¹⁷ Anthony Giddens, *Global Capitalism*, Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens, eds., (New York: New York Press, distributed by W.W. Norton, 2000).
- ¹⁸ A concrete example of a folkway that may be familiar to many Presbyterians is what happens when a small group of people (six or seven) is gathering informally at a coffee hour or during a meeting break and another person approaches the group. In the United States, the person approaching inserts her or himself into the conversation and is included. For people coming from Latin America this can be difficult to learn because in Latin America, when someone approaches a group like this, the group immediately acknowledges the presence of the person and welcomes the person into the circle. So, for Latin Americans, it is rude to intrude oneself into the group; i.e., one expects to be noticed and invited. Lack of such invitation is initially perceived as rejection, while for the U.S. Americans the insertion of another person in the group is not a big deal. Is there a distinct social value orientation behind such an inter-personal dynamic?
- ¹⁹ K., Ohmae, *Third Power: The Coming Shape of Global Competition*. New York, Free Press, 1985.
- M. E. Porter, "Competition and global industries; in *Competition in Global Industries*, (Boston/Mass: Harvard Business School Press).
- ²⁰ "In its broadest sense, globalization refers to the rapid growth of linkages and interconnections between nations and social communities which make up the present world system. Thus, any meaningful discussion of globalization must begin with a recognition that it may mean different things to different people: For some it refers primarily the vast spread of global

communication. Others think it best conveys the homogenization of consumer cultures. For still others, it is mostly a way of drawing attention to the emerging consciousness of our mutual dependence on the life support system of our small planet. Many others believe it is best reserved to describe economic globalization –the erasing of economic borders to allow the free flow of goods and money. And still others wonder if it might best be used to acknowledge the spread of global civil society –a force that questions other forms of globalization, especially economic globalization." Gordon Douglass, *The Globalization of Economic Life. Challenge to the Church* (Louisville: ACSWP, 2001), p. 1.

²¹ John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*, (Chicago and Cambridge, UK: The University of Chicago Press and Polity Press, 1999), p. 2.

²² Aarjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Public Works, vol. 1 (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996)

²³ Peter Berger, "Four Faces of Global Culture." *National Internet* 49:23-29.

²⁴ Peter Berger, *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World* (Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington eds., Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 4.

²⁵ Berger, *Many Globalizations*, p. 6.

²⁶ Peter Berger, *Many Globalizations*, p. 2.

²⁷ Aarjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," *Public Culture*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1990).

²⁸ Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Ballantine books, 1995, 1996), pp. 141 ff.

²⁹ Barber, p. 76.

³⁰ Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, fourth edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), p. 21-22.

³¹ Barber, pp. 141 ff.

³² Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, "Homogenization of Global Culture," in *The Case Against the Global Economy and a Turn Toward the Local*, Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, eds., (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996), p. 75.

³³ Rev. Dr. Kim Young-Bok, unpublished interview printed in Report 4a, "Notes from All Interviews Conducted by the Worldwide Ministries' Division, Ecumenical Partnerships Team," topic: "Dynamics in the World and Global Church to which the PCUSA should respond in the next decade," p. 61.

³⁴ H. D. S. Greenway, "The news about the news since Sept, 11: Not good." In *The Boston Globe*, July 5, 2002, p. A11.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Leonard Downie and Robert Kaiser, *The News About the News: American Journalism in Peril*, (New York: Knopf, 2002), pp. 10, 25.

³⁷ Martin Carnoy, Manuel Castells, Stephen Cohen, and Fernando Enrique Cardoso, *The New Global Economy in the Information Age* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), pp. 15-43.

³⁸ Haruito Shiomi and Kazu Wada, eds., *Fordism Transformed: The Development of Production Methods in the Automobile Industry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19954), pp. 11-27.

³⁹ Vandana Shiva and Radha Holla-Bhar, "Piracy by Patent: The Case of the Neem Tree," in *The Case Against the Global Economy*, pp.147-48.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁴¹ Stephen B. Brush, "Protectors, Prospectors, and Pirates of Biological Resources," in *On Biocultural Diversity: Linking Language, Knowledge and the Environment*, Luisa Maffi, ed., (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press), p. 517.

⁴² Strathern, 1996 in Stephen Brush, pp. 526-27.

⁴³ Vandana Shiva, "War Against Nature and the People of the South" in *Views from the South: The Effects of Globalization and the WTO on Third World Countries*, Sarah Anderson, ed., (San Francisco: IFG, nd), pp. 117-18.

⁴⁴ Shiva, p. 95.

⁴⁵ Shiva, p. 99.

⁴⁶ Shiva, p.102.

⁴⁷ quoted by Shiva, p. 98.

⁴⁸ "We are what we eat," found in the *Minutes, 214th General Assembly (2002)*, pp. 231, 533-559.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, the data that follows is compiled from "We are what we eat."

⁵⁰ Con Agra, Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, and Tyson/IBP are among the giants in the production, processing, and marketing of food. . . . These corporations make up a **global network**. (bold added) Food is produced as cash crops for export in countries where labor is cheap while the purchase of the food product in those same countries is often prohibitive for local consumers and limited to people with financial means. United States' trade agreements with other nations are often influenced by these same corporations. This leaves farmers in developing countries, who traditionally produced their food on their land, with either no control over their own land or diminished ability to produce food for their own table. Now farmland is controlled by transnational corporations and farm products are sent to wealthy nations, resulting in profits for the transnational corporations, leaving local people in economic despair. ("We are what we eat" "We are what we eat" suggests cooperativism as an alternative to corporativism).

- ⁵¹ Cameron Harder, "Overcoming Cultural and Spiritual Obstacles to Rural Revitalization," in *Writing of the Rural West: Globalization, Governments and the Transformation of Rural Communities*, Roger Epp and Dave Whitson, eds. (Alberta: The University of Alberta Press, 2001), p. 233.
- ⁵² In Harder, p. 230.
- ⁵³ In Harder, p. 235, n. #23.
- ⁵⁴ In Harder, p. 227.
- ⁵⁵ Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, "Electronic Money and the Cassino Economy," in *The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn Toward the Local*, p.366 ff.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 361.
- ⁵⁸ On electronic transfer: "CHIPS is the New York Clearing House Interbank Payment System. Inside a reinforced concrete-and-glass office building on a run-down block on Manhattan's West Side, two Unisys A-15 J mainframe computers about the size of refrigerators dispatch funds across the earth." (Barnet and Cavanagh, "Electronic Money," p. 363).
- ⁵⁹ For a concrete illustration of this development, see sections on the globalization of industrial agriculture and the fate of family farmers.
- ⁶⁰ R. O'Brien, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography* (London: Routledge, 1992).
- ⁶¹ S. Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilization and Disciplinary Neoliberalism," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, London, vol. 24, n.3.
- ⁶² Robert Kuttner, "Double Standard on globalization," *Boston Globe*, July 30, 2003, p. A15.
- ⁶³ Ralph Nader and Lori Wallach, "GATT, NAFTA, and the Subversion of the Democratic Process," in *The Case Against the Global Economy and for a Turn Toward the Local*, p. 106.
- ⁶⁴ Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy." in *The Globalization Reader*, Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, eds., (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000) p. 327.
- ⁶⁵ Christina Turner quoted by John Tomlison, *Globalization and Culture* (Chicago and Cambridge, UK: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).
- ⁶⁶ Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalization and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995, 1996), p. 60.
- ⁶⁷ By the 18th century the legal doctrine of "Sovereign Immunity" (that states are immune from suits from private parties) was widely accepted. This doctrine has been challenged only very recently with lawsuits in U.S. courts on behalf of victims of international terrorism. Attorney Allan Gerson filed law suit against Libya on behalf of the victims of Pan Am flight 103 which was destroyed over Lockerbie in 19???. To Mr. Gerson's surprise the State Department filed an *amicus curie* on behalf of Libya and against the interests of U.S. citizens, in order to protect the international principle of Sovereign Immunity. Now Mr. Gerson is the co-counsel for a multi-billion dollar lawsuit against various defendants, including Saudi Arabian Princes and the government of Sudan for allegedly aiding Osama bin Laden and Al Quid. Mr. Gerson is intentionally challenging the doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. The U.S. government understands the implications of such legal precedents for the future of the nation-state. Commenting on these law suits, Harvard Law professor Allan Dershowitz argued that the Justice Department is likely to file a similar brief in the case against the Saudis because the discovery phase of such law suits by private attorneys general can, in principle, undermine diplomacy by disclosing to the public information that the government does not want to go public. "We do not know what deals they may have cut with the Saudis." (WBUR, "The Connection" 8/16/02).
- ⁶⁸ E. Hobsbawm, *Nações e Nacionalismo desde 1780* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1992).
- ⁶⁹ In Ralph Nader and Lori Wallach. "GATT, NAFTA, and the Subversion of the Democratic Process." in *The Case Against the Global Economy*, p. 96.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 102.
- ⁷¹ Kenichi Ohmae, "The End of the Nation State," in *The Globalization Reader*, p. 207.
- ⁷² Ohmae, op. Cit., p. 208.
- ⁷³ Ohmae, p. 211.
- ⁷⁴ By the "Washington Consensus" Stiglitz is referring to a consensus among the U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank about the economic approach they pursue in tandem for the developing world.
- ⁷⁵ Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002), p.74.
- ⁷⁶ Nader and Wallach, p. 95.
- ⁷⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1997).
- ⁷⁸ Huntington, p. 210.
- ⁷⁹ Bernald Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified," *Atlantic Monthly*, 266 (September 1990), p. 60, quoted by Huntington, p. 213.
- ⁸⁰ Masudul Alam Choudhury and Uzir Abdul Malik, *The Foundations of Islamic Political Economy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 103-145.
- ⁸¹ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), pp. 97 ff.

⁸² Berman, op cit.

⁸³ Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest. Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (Willmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2002), p. 66.

⁸⁴ William Pfaff, "A Conflict of U.S., Muslim Values," In *The Boston Globe*, Dec. 16, 2002, p. A19.

⁸⁵ Ira Rifkin, *Spiritual Perspectives on Globalization* (Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths Publishing, 2003), p.49.

⁸⁶ *Joint Vision 2020*, U.S. Department of Defense (available at www.dtic.mil/jointvision).

⁸⁷ Reference to "information" as a domain of military operations should not be lost in this age of commodification of information and informatization of culture. The Iraq war brought us also "imbedded media" coverage with rigorous management of information flow and analysis and severe penalties for those who breached them – e.g., Heraldo Rivera and Peter Arnet.

⁸⁸ *Joint Vision 2020*, p. 6.

⁸⁹ "There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack. If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Rome's allies; and if Rome had no allies, then allies would be invented. When it was utterly impossible to contrive such an interest--why, then it was the national honor that had been insulted. The fight was always invested with an aura of legality. Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbors, always fighting for a breathing space. The whole world was pervaded by a host of enemies, and it was manifestly Rome's duty to guard against their indubitably aggressive designs." Joseph Schumpeter, "The Sociology of Imperialism," in *Two Essays by Joseph Schumpeter* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 51, quoted by Michael Parenti, *The Assassination of Julius Caesar: A People's History of Ancient Rome* (New York, London: The New Press, 2003), p. 19.

⁹⁰ David Little. "Terrorism, Public Emergency, and International Order: The U.S. Example."

⁹¹ Even military operations are eventually privatized as documented by Peter Singer in *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003). "This new 'Privatized Military Industry' encompasses hundreds of companies, thousands of employees, and billions of dollars in revenue. Whether as proxies or suppliers, such firms have participated in wars in Africa, Asia, the Balkans, and Latin America. More recently, they have become a key element in U.S. military operations." (From book jacket.) The cover of the book is a picture of MPRI personnel conducting Senior Observer/Controller Training in Kuwait.

⁹² Anthony Giddens, *Global Capitalism* Will Hutton and Anthony Giddens, eds., (New York: New York Press, distributed by W. W. Norton, 2000).

⁹³ Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, "The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World," in *The Globalization Reader*, p. 220.

⁹⁴ Juliet Schor, *The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure* (Basic Books: 1991), p. 30.

⁹⁵ Schor, p. 35.

⁹⁶ Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Singapore: Simon and Schuster, 2000).

⁹⁷ Nigel Thrift, "A Capitalist Time Consciousness," in *The Sociology of Time*, John Hassard, ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 122.

⁹⁸ Rev. Dr. Kim Yon-Bok, unpublished interview printed in Report 4a, "Notes from All Interviews Conducted by the Worldwide Ministries' Division, Ecumenical Partnerships Team," topic: "Dynamics in the World and Global Church to which the PCUSA should respond in the next decade," p. 60.

⁹⁹ Revelation 3.17.

¹⁰⁰ Max Weber, *General Economic History*, translated by F. H. Knight (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 275-78.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

¹⁰² Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1958, 1976) p. 78

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹⁰⁴ Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Totowa, NJ: Bedminster, 1921, 1968).

¹⁰⁵ John Love, *McDonald's Behind the Arches* (Toronto: Bentam, 1986), p. 141-142, quoted in George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society* (Thousand Oaks, CA, London, New Dehli: Pine Forge Press, 2000), p. 38.

¹⁰⁶ Alterity: from alter = other, distinction. The concept of alterity informs the rationale of "Building Community Among Strangers," a policy paper adopted by the P.C. (U.S.A.) 211th General Assembly in 1999. In "Building Community" we read: "Alterity is the antithesis to totality. While totality erases distinctions, alterity celebrates them. While totality swallows the other, alterity affirms the other: I am not you, you are not me; therefore, we can be in community." (*Building Community Among Strangers*, approved by the 211th General Assembly, 1999, of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), p. 19.) But "alterity" does not exist in the vocabulary (and the culture) of the Microsoft Word Thesaurus.

